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INTRODUCTION

This country is now engaged in What is undeniably an historic reconstruction Of

many of the federal government's most important interventions in tie private
economy. One by one, regulatory prograns, which have had an enormous influence
on key sectors of the nation's economy, are being removed or substantially
reduced: airlines, railroads, crude oil, banking, natural gas. trucking, conimunications, and so on. In every instance, the practical prol)lel of managing the
transition from economic regulation to reliance on the marketplace is a major issue
in the decision to deregulate.
These historic shifts in regulator,, policy have substantial effects on the fortunes
of many of the nation's most powerful interest groups. This adds more than a
mere hint of politics to these attempts to markedly reduce government intervention
in the economy. Table I illustrates one consultant's analvsis of the ef'fects of
trucking deregulation. We present it here not to argue the merits of trucking
deregulation, nor the accuracy of this particular forecast (although we think it is
reasonably on target), but mterely to illustrate the effects of reform on various
sectors. In essence, the Table is a balance sheet for trucking deregulattion. Even a
cursory review shows winners (shippers and consumers receive draniatically lower
transportation costs), losers (regulated trucking companies experience diminished
earnings), and those who draw (growth in wage rates declines. but total eniployment rises sharply).
The point is that the transition from regulation to competition affects many
people's fortunes in dramatic ways. Those who would manage this transition
successfully must devise policies which, among other things, rellect these effects.
Our direct experience in the case of airline dereguLitin. cTiide oil decontrol. rail,
truck, and bus deregulation, and other regulatory programs, has led us to believe
that the transition problems involved in moving from regulation to clpetition

often are poorly understood both from an economic andia political viewpoint.
Thus, we have two objectives in this article. The first is to describe, in a generic but
practical fashion, the problems which arise in moving f romi strict ecolInomic regulation to reliance on the market forces of competition. The second isto suggest some

practical ways to address these problenls by devising transition mechanisnls which
* © Copyright 1981 by Duke University. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent those of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
t Chairman. Interstate Commerce Conmissiui.
' Director of the Office of the Chairman. titerstate (itmerce Commission.
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are relatively economically efficient, encourage the appropriate aliotnt of innliovation, speed the private sector's move toward competitive behavior, and dodge the
political pitfalls which can endanger these regulatory' reforms.
One final introductory point is in order. Many of the problems we discuss here
are associated with substantial changes in regulatory lpolicy, including increased
regulation, decreased regulation, or simple vacillation. We intend to focus only on
problems arising in the move front regulation toward increased competition.
I
T RANI TION
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One of the most visible problems in managing the transition fiom regulation to
competition is to ensure that pricing freedom is kept commensurate with the
degree of competition in the regulated industry. Most frequently, this requires
striking a balance between increased pricing freedom and eased entry into the
industry during the transition. Obviously, if an industry which government has
shielded from competition for several decades were suddenly given complete
pricing freedom, simultaneous With the removal of regulatory barriers to entrv, a
potential for sudden dramatic price increases Would exist during the tiansition
period to effective competitive entry. 'To a limited degree, this was true in the case
of airline deregulation. In cases where other factors exist such as legally-sanctioned
collective price setting, the existence of' anti-competitive operating restrictions, or
the existence of triuly "captive" buyers, pricing freedom may have to be balanced
against, or made commensurate with, the rate at which a series of anti-competitive
regulatory requirements are removed and effective competition is introduced.
Although this is one of the most commonly recognized transition problems,
there are instances where it has gone unrecognized. For example, at one point the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) considered allowing interstate bits companies upward rate flexibility without explicitly tying this freedom to any changes in
2
the anti-competitive elements of bus iregulation..
Solution 1: Proper Sequencing
Obviously, one solution to this particular transition problem is to devise a
proper sequencing for reforms. A "proper'" secquence is one which reduces the
opportunity for any market power resulting From years of anti-competitive regulation to be exploited in a transition period during Which sutbstantial piricing flexibility
is permitted. The trucking reform bill recently passed by Congress provides an
excellent example of deliberate and balanced timing of both pricing freedom and
elimination of anti-competitive regulatory protection.:' In the first year, the bill

1. However, we should point out tha such slo't-tern
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2. Ex Parte No. MC-125. Fare Flexibility
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3. References to trucking legislation are to lub. L. No. 96-29GIi. 94 Stat. 793. Motr(t
1980, unless otherwise noted.
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allows individual trucking companies to raise their rates at least 10 percent without
regulatory interference. At the same time, the bill instructs the ICC to dismantle
rapidly a host of anti-competitive operating restrictions and substantially lower the
regulatory barriers which impede new entry into the industry and the expansion of
existing firms into new markets. In the second year, the bill permits the Commission to increase the upward rate freedom from 10 to 15 percent if competition is
deemed adequate. Finally, in the third year, the amount of upward rate freedom is
enlarged still further. But, this additional pricing flexibility is followed in the
succeeding year by the elimination of antitrust immunity for collectively setting the
majority of trucking rates and comes two full years after the effective date of the
liberalized entry policies.
The trucking legislation provides an example of a particularly good scheme for
balancing of pricing and entry feeedom. The experience with air freight, however,
provides an example of the problems which arise during the transition period
when there is a poor sequencing of pricing and entry freedoms coupled with the
existence of price levels at the beginning of the transition which are artificially
depressed through regulation. In the case of air freight, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) had held rates as much as 30 to 40 percent below costs. This,
combined with a transition mechanism which simultaneously lifted regulatory
restraints on pricing and entry, led to a rapid escalation in air cargo rates which, in
retrospect, was not surprising. 4 Similarly unsurprising was the way in which
opponents of a return to competition used the example of air freight in an attempt
to discredit regulatory reform in the airline and trucking industries.
The air cargo lesson suggests that developing a "proper" sequence for introducing pricing freedom requires a clear understanding of' the situation immediately
prior to the start of the transition period. If it had been widely recognized that air
cargo rates were far below costs, that this was a result of existing regulation, and
that this virtually ensured rates would rise to compensatory levels as the regulatory
lid was lifted, one of two possible changes might have been made. First, pricing
freedom might have been lagged or phased in gradually preceded by eased entry.
But, in this case, this would have only ensured that there was ample competitive
restraint on rates once they had risen to compensatory levels. For surely, no one
believes that additional entry can keep rates 30 to 40 percent below the cost of'
providing service. In our view, the only sensible approach was not to lag pricing
freedom behind entry (though that could have been done), but rather to bite the
bullet by admitting that regulatory policy called for compensatory rates and acting
on that admission by granting substantial rate increases prior to deregulation. This
would have avoided lending any credence to the bogus argument that deregulation
caused higher air cargo rates when, in truth, the regulatory agency had failed to
allow compensatory rates.5
4. Domestic Air Freight Investigation (DAFRI) (1975), see also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, DOMESTIC
(June 1979).
5. This approach was adopted in an early version of the legislation to deregulate the household
goods movers industry-S. 1798, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980), The Household Goods Transportation
Act of 1979. The bill would require the ICC to set compensatory rate levels before pricing freedom
becomes effective.
AIR CARGO DEREGULATION
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Solution 2: Market Segmentation
An alternative or, in some cases, a complementary solution to proper sequencing
is market segmentation. This is most appropriate when the transition problems
associated with substantial pricing are clearly limited to specific market segments or
operations. In the case of rail regulation, for example, existing reform legislation--the
4R Act-divides the rail transportation market into four distinct segments.' First,
the railroads are permitted total pricing freedom for any transportation which is
deregulated by the ICC under its general exemption authority. At the same time,
however, they do not enjoy the right to set these rates collectively with immunity
from the antitrust laws. Second, railroads are also permitted complete pricing
freedom for transportation services performed inder a long-term contract freely
negotiated between the railroad and a shipper. Third, railroads enjoy substantially
unrestricted pricing freedom where there is no evidence that a particular railroad
holds a "market dominant" position' with respect to the traffic in question. The
fourth market segment-where a railroad is market dominant-is the only case
where the regulatory agency (in this case, the ICC) places limits on pricing
freedom. By segmenting rail transportation in this manner, substantial pricing
freedom is permitted in those areas where there is no market power to exploit, or
where a railroad's ability to exploit it is curtailed or eliminated.
The 4R Act is not the only example of a solution based on market segmentation. The ICC had proposed a tentative scheme allowing pricing freedom for the
trucking industry which would permit individual segments of the trucking industry
greater pricing flexibility based on the intensity of competition.' The CAB, in
implementing the Airline Deregulation Act, also adopted a policy of targeting
increased pricing freedom to routes where the, ftound competition to be sufficiently

vigorous. We should point out that the market segmentation solution can present special
problems in cases where regulatory limitations on rate increases allow for returns
above competitive levels and are applied through some type of overall rate of
return standard. In such a case, the regulatory agency would have to: (1) separate
the segments for regulatory purposes, (2) abandon rate-of-return style regulation,
or (3) risk having excellent (or poor) earnings on the portion of business conducted

inder flexible pricing (presumably because it is competitive) automatically depress
(or inflate) the rate levels in the more stringently regulated segment.
One possible example where a regulatory agency could face this choice is the
bus industry. Here, the ICC, on the basis of the level of actual or potential
competition, might allow substantial pricing freedom For one of the services in the
6. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976)
(codified in sections of 15, 45, 49 U.S.C.).
7. I.e., holds substantial market power over particular shippers.
8. Ex Parte No. MC-135, Master Certificatesfor Motor Carriersof Freight, see also INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMM'N, THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE MOTOR CARRIER TASK FoRicF (May 1979).

9.

Even before the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. Pub. L. No. 95-504. 92 Stat. 1705

(1978), the CAB placed routes into three categories-workably conipetitive, intermediate. and
in each. See 14 C.F.R. Sec. 399.31(h). 43
monopoly-and allowed different degrees of pricing flexibility
Fed. Reg. 39522 (1978). The CAB preserved this approach in implementing the act.
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following pairs: (a) regular route passenger operations and package express service, or (b) all aspects of regular route service including package express and
charter service. The Commission could allocate costs between the individual services in each pair. In the case of pair (b) this would be easily feasible. But, for pair
(a), the joint costs (or non-allocable costs) represent an extremely high percentage
of the total cost of providing these services, thus making the two rate-making
regimes-one flexible and one more stringent-difficult to operate. If costs are
not kept separate and the rate of return regulation is maintained, a seesawing
effect, with returns on the flexibly-priced services determining in part the rate
levels for more strictly regulated services, is likely.]()
We should note that our discussion of the importance of timing in introducing
rate flexibility does not reduce to the simple maxim, "the slower the better." First,
we should not forget that flexible pricing provides benefits to both buyers and
sellers, benefits which are at least temporarily denied by Unnecessary delay in
dismantling restrictive pricing regulation. Moreover, our experience with numerous federal regulatory programs suggests that there is often more co)mpetition in
regulated markets than some buyers seeking additional leverage through the
government and those who are simply committed to economic regulation are
willing to admit. The bus industry, mentioned above, is an excellent example. That
industry may be characterized by restricted intra-modal competition as a result of
federal and state regulation. However, it clearly faces fierce competition from the
private automobile, the airlines, and AMTRAK (the latter being subsidized by all
taxpayers including bus riders). Additionally, if partial regulatory ref oir., such as
eased entry, stimulates inter-firm competition which cannot be manifested through
vigorous price competition, it will almost certainly make itself felt through wasteful
service competition." Finally, in a case where an indtustrV like the railroads has
been crippled by years of stringent rate regulation, its very ability to deliver
services to buyers may depend on relatively rapid movenient to greater pricing
freedom.
B.

Production Inefficiencies

In every case of which we are aware, a critical element in attempts to move an
industry from regulation to competition is the elimination of' crippling inefficiencies
which result from these regulator,, programs. just as increased effticiencv is an
ultimate objective of deregulation, it is also an important concern during the
transition period. Yet, there are many examples of reform prograls which
maintain or even exacerbate inefficiencies during the transition.
The crude oil decontrol program, for example, contained pricing provisions which
provided incentives to target investment on particular types of oil production

10. A structurally similar problem arises \%henf ai firm1)
provides both interstate aid int rlastate ser ice
and is simultaneously subject to both state and federal regUlation. In so(me CIses, state regulator\
agencies have been reluctant to allow higher rates on intrastate operlations. thus placing financial
pressures on the industry to seek higher rates on interstate operations Ihtan would otherwise be the case.
11. This is widely recognized to have been the case in (ie airline industry p~rior to deregulation.
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during the two and one-half year transition period. The program announced
in April 1979, allowed production from newly discovered wells and tertiary
recovery projects to rise from a controlled price of approximately $13.00 to the
then current world price of approximately $18.00 per barrel. However, production
from secondary recovery techniques and marginal well reworking will not reach
the world price until September 30, 1981. Thus, during this two and one-half year
period, there is an incentive to focus incremental investment on those fields and
wells where returns, as determined by the artificial price differential. are greatest
and not where returns reflect the true market value of' tile pro)duction. In short,
the transition period preserves the inefficient allocation of investment between
types of production.
A similar problem is evident in the transition inechan isin for natural gas
deregulation. The Natural Gas Policy Act allowed the price of "(feep field"" gas
to rise immediately to the market price. In comiast. the price of ,osltother types
of natural gas production was placed on a modest upward trajectory. This incentive structure has had a predictable result. In 1977. ihe oil and gas industry drilled
414 deep wells. But in 1979, well into the transition period. they increased the
number of deel) wells drilled by 30 percent to 614. )rilling wells below 15.000 feet
costs approximately five times as much as those sunk to oiily 5.000 feet.' TIhus. the
price differential could he substantially distorting investment away froin Iow cost
drilling opportunities in price controlled gas fields and toward iiore costly deep
field drilling."
Solution 1.- Refuse to Segment Production as to M-1e
Obviously, in the examples given above, the inefficiency springs frout product
price differentials artificially induced bhv regulation. An equally obvious solution is
to employ transition mechanisms which do notallow for artificial pricing (Iifferentials. In the case of crude oil decontrol. for example. this co1uld have been
accomplished by setting a single new oil price for all production and then gradunally
raising this price to the world level. Ihis alone would have solved the inefficiency
in allocating Investment among fields. but unless this hypothetical iiiforii starting
price had been at least as high as the average domestic crude oil piice. this solution
would come at the cost of' two other c-ucial ob.jectives in lie decomtrol decision:
getting the U.S. crude oil price to worid levels as soon as possible and eliminating
the overall disincentive against investment in maiai iing 0r increasing U.S. production.
We believe this offers atmore general lesson on the (fuestioi of dealing with
inefficiencies induced by particular transition mechanisms. In beginning this article.
we stated that one of our objectives was to suggest transitioin iechanisins which

12.
13.
14.
15.

Natural (;as Policv Act of 1978. Pit.

L. No. 95-621. 15 U.S.C. § 33 )1 (Supp. 11 1978).

"Deep field"
gas is recovered below 1.)0)
These statitics were reported in tile\Vtll

feet.

tri'ee t
tournal.
Maiti 27. 198) at 4fi( cI. 1.
of soitte of these int'esthieitls, it isnot dfear tow serious (i.e.,
cosil\0
actoaly are. If tiletransition teriod is short etnottgh, as pethaps is tie case with the

Given the long-term tnature

these (istOrtions

crude oildecontrol schedule. the distortions mua

le miniial.
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were relatively economically efficient. By definition, a transition scheme which
maintains elements of the regulatory program being dismantled cannot be efficient
except when compared to alternative transition mechanisms, not the free market.
If regulators, economists and economists/regulators pay too much attention to
short-term inefficiencies during the transition, they risk losing sight of the ultimate
objectives of deregulation and how fast they are being achieved.
Solution 2: Limit the Duration and Size of Price Differentials
Having warned against overemphasizing the problems of transition inefficiencies,
we will note that all other things being equal, there is merit, of course, in limiting
the duration and size of artificial price differentials whenever possible. In this
regard, the crude oil decontrol program withstands review better since, in the first
year, the two-tiered pricing system for "old" oil production is collapsed into a
single higher-priced tier which is then gradually raised to the world oil price.
Solution 3: Pick Market Segmentation to Minimize Inefficienc),
A final method, for at least partially addressing transition inefficiencies, is to
segment the market on the basis of likely efficiency losses. For example, if in the
case of deep drilling for gas, we know in advance that roughly similar unit
production costs occur in fields down to the 15,000 foot level, we might demarcate
the production-based price differential at 10,000 feet to ensure that. during the
transition, higher product prices, and hence investment, do not target on the
markedly more costly pockets.
Unfortunately, this example illustrates the serious flaw in this approach. It is
unlikely that managers of the transition would have the information necessary to
reduce significantly the transition inefficiencies in this manner. Moreover, there is a
certain incongruity in an approach which assumes exceptional competence and
knowledge of the regulatory process as part of the scheme to eliminate regulatory
programs, which are often seen as impossible to run competently.
Along these same lines, it is interesting to note that an enormous amount of
attention was devoted during the crude oil decontrol debate to the issue of
production inefficiencies during the transition period. Some participants argued at
length about the serious nature of these distortions. The most important of these
was the "withholding" argument.(" Proponents argued that rapid decontrol of
crude oil prices would induce producers to suppress production in anticipation of
dramatic rapid price increases.
Though this concern was understandable, it illustrates the problem of focusing
too much on the interim distortions and too little on the ultimate objective of
returning to the market. For example, the concern over withholding turned out to
be unwarranted in retrospect. The decontrol scheme ultimately adopted does
16. This issue was first raised in the debate by William Nordhaus, a member of the Council of
Economic Advisers. Though he concluded that withholding was unlikely. the spectre was continually
revisited by lower level staffers in the Administration and Congress. W. Nordaus, Withholding
Incentives Under a Decline Rate Proposal (Nov. 22, 1978) (Cotuncil of Economic Advisors internal
memorandum).
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provide for fairly rapid price increases, but a closer inspection reveals no obvious
incentive to withhold. 17 The gravity of the withholding argument lay in its potential
effect on the decontrol program itself', since, if taken seriously, it would have
supported a decision to decontrol immediately or to drag the decontrol schedule
out. Either one would have solved the withholding lproblem had there been one,
but the first called for price increases so dramatic as to threaten the policy itself',
while the second required the Administration to seek an extension of controls
beyond October 1981.1 Thus, a concern for a potential interim distortion could
have led to continuation of oil price controls in either instance.
C.
Vinners and Losers
The "balance sheet" approach for trucking de regulation noted earlier could be
repeated for each instance where government regulation is eliminated or substantially reduced. Our economy is extremely dynamic, and under restrictive regulation
rents quickly flow to those advantaged by regulatory policy. Thus, there are
winners and losers when those policies are changed or eliminated. One of the most
difficult problems in managing transitions toward competition is to deal with these
gains and losses and the inevitable political forces they generate.
Crude oil decontrol and the deregulation of natural gas involves the most
massive transfers of any regulatory change we have seen. Over the course of
several decades, hundreds of billions of dollars. formerlv held by oil users as a
result of crude oil and natural gas price conitrols. will be returned to pioducers
allowed to charge the market price. But there will be other shifts as well. The
domestic petrochemical industry whose advantage in world markets is principally
derived from the artificially depressed prices of its basic il)uts-natural gas and
liquids-will see that advantage disappear. Small retlineries whose federal subsidies, derived from the crude oil price control program, are the source of substantial profits will find those subsidies disappearing. On the other hand. producers of
competing energy sources--coal, nuclear, and sola-will find their products fare
much better in fair market competition with increasingly more costly sup~plies of oil
and natural gas.
Policy changes supporting pro-comlpetitive rail mergers have similar effects.
Some railroads face much stiffer competition from inerged rail carriers which gain
new advantages such as longer average line hauls, less need to pertform costly
switching and interline service, and shorter routiings between origins and destinations. On the other hand, shippers on the merged lines and consumers of their
products benefit from rate reductions or improved rail services. Changes in
regulatory policy governing rail revenue divisions between iterlining carriers offer
an even more stark example. Since 1953. the ICC has mandated the revenue split
between railroads offering joint north-south service in the eastern half of the

17.

Blankenship, Production Withholding Incentives Under Proposed Domestic Oil Decontrol, Off. of Pol'y

Evaluation/Dep't of Energy, Memorandum (June 8, 1979).

18. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the statute auithorizing crude oilprice controls, will
expire September 30. 1981.
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country. 9 In the absence of freely negotiated revenue divisions, we cannot be
absolutely sure that those mandated are incorrect, but the fact that the northern
railroads have been demanding changes for over a decade, while the southern
railroads have been resisting, suggests that removing the regulated divisions would
alter the revenue split between the connecting lines.
Solution 1: Side Payments
One method for easing the pain of transfers attendant to deregulation is to
provide for side payments. There is a persuasive argument, of course, that
eliminating the regulatory policies which caused the original transfers is the correct
course to take, and any such "righting" of the original wrong need not be
accompanied by bribes to gain the cooperation or acquiescence of those who would
lose if the market were to operate freely once again.
In many cases, we are inclined to agree with this view. There are, however, two
potentially persuasive arguments for requiring side payments of some sort though
not necessarily ones which fully compensate losers in the transition. First, as a
matter of equity, it might be proper to compensate individuals who have made
substantial investments, relying in large part on implicit guarantees from the
government that the economic environment created by regulation would prevail.
The second, and more important, argument offers a strictly pragmatic reason for
considering side payments. Simply put. there are cases where a side payment
scheme may be necessary as a political matter to complete the transition from
regulation to the marketplace. We will offer examples which illustrate these two
arguments and their ultimate effect on the transition.
On April 17, 1980, the ICC approved the largest railroad merger in history. 20
This merger, linking the Burlington Northern with the St. Louis and San Francisco
Railroad, will result in heightened competition between the merged railroad and its
chief competitors. The Commission had a decades old policy of attaching operating restrictions on a merged line to prevent it from using the lower costs resulting
from the merger to divert traffic from competing roads. 2 The Commission,
realizing that such restrictions would leave competitors whole, but prevent any
economic gains from the merger, considered three options. First, they could simply
refuse to attach the operating restrictions and expose these railroads to the
additional competition. Second, they could attach the restrictions for a limited
period of time to allow the competing lines to prepare. And third, they could give
the competing lines a choice between imposition of the restrictions on the merged
line and a mutually negotiated cash settlement in lieu of the restrictions.
In this case, however, the Commission chose to attach the restrictions for no
more than two years and to not allow the alternative of negotiating a cash

19. See 287 I.C.C. 497 (1953); 289 I.C.C. 4 (1953): 325 I.C.C. 1 (1965); 377 I.C.C. 74 (1970).
20. Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. IF), Bulington Northern. Inc.--Control and Alerge-St.
Louis-San Francisco Railwav Company, ICC (April 17. 1980).
21. These conditions are commonly referred to as the DT&I conditions after a case involving the
Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton Railroad.
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settlement. The equity argument for a longer period of protection from competition was less persuasive since the merger had been discussed for many years, more
than enough time to prepare for the adjustment. Moreover, it was clear that this
pro-competitive change could not be blocked by opponents, thus removing another
possible reason to consider side-payments. Yet, this was only the second time the
ICC had ever failed to attach these restrictions. The ICC's reluctant acquiescence
in applying the restrictions one last time was itself a transition mechanism, for, in
the same decision, the Commission announced that not only would they expire in
two years, but that the Commission was proposing neither to apply them at all in
future cases nor to preserve those imposed in the past decisions.
Another example of a side payment, albeit on a far grander scale, is the Carter
Administration's windfall profits tax on crude oil. The course of the Congressional
debate on the windfall profits tax and, more importantly, the unexpectedly weak
opposition to the President's decision to decontrol oil prices demonstrated the
effectiveness of the tax as a side payment. Congressmen clearly indicated that they
felt justified in accepting the decontrol of crude oil prices in part because of the
merits of the action and in part because the windfall tax returnedi a sizeable
portion of the increase in oil revenues to the public.
In our view the equity argument has some legitimacy in this case, particularly
with regard to investment choices made in energy and home heating facilities.
Nevertheless, the chief difference between crude oil decontrol and the BN-Frisco
merger is that the opponents of decontrol had a realistic chance to block the return
to the market, and failure to propose a side payment in the form of a tax would
22
have strengthened their position.Solution 2: Parallel Deregulation
Some cases allow for a different solution to the problem of transfers. They arise
when two regulated industries reach a competitive equilibrum with one another.
Eliminating regulatory restrictions on one indlustiry gives it a competitive advantage
over its regulated rival profoundly disturbing the previous e(tuilibrium. The
solution is simply to allow equal opportunities by responding to deregulation in
one industry by taking parallel action in the other.
An example of this approach is the ICC's recent exemption of rail movement of
fresh fruits and vegetables. 2 : Truck transportation of these comnlodities has been

deregulated for the last several decades while rail carriage has remained strictly
regulated. Predictably, the railroads share of this traffic has declined dramatically
over the last two decades. The Commission was aware of this Unequal regulatory
treatment when it freed railroad movement of fresh fruits and vegetables from

22. In retrospect, the side payment took on even greater political importance since soon thereafter
the world oil price leaped from the $18.00 per barrel level when decontrol was announced to nearly
$30.00 per barrel and visibly swelled the inventory profits of the major oil companies. But, the windfall
profits tax will extract much of this increase in the coming years.
23. Ex Parte No. 346 (Sub. No. 1), Rail General Exeimption Authwity-Fresh Fruits aid Vegetables. 361
I.C.C. 74 (1979).
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regulation. The railroads responded in a spectacular manner, increasing their
24
market share by 24 to 40 percent in only seven months.
The attempt to introduce coal slurry pipelines offers an interesting and important example as well. The regulation of rail rates for coal movements is one of the
most difficult problems blocking comprehensive rail deregulation. The problem
stems from the relatively strong market power of the railroads once a major
coal-using facility has been sited. Yet, by blocking new competition from slurry
pipelines, the railroads have also blocked development of the circumstances which
would permit substantial, if not total, deregulation of coal rates. The need for strict
regulation of rail coal rates (or for that matter, pipeline rates) would be significantly
diminished if these pipelines could be developed. Thus, the railroads' stance blocks
the preconditions necessary for consideration of the parallel deregulation approach
for rail coal rates.
The parallel deregulation approach in practice, however, has one flaw. There is
a great temptation for regulators, even those managing the transition to the market
place, to adopt the parallel part of' the approach by looking to parallel restrictions
rather than parallel opportunities. Complicated regulatory policies designed to
"balance" competition during the transition period become undesirable when they
begin to draw attention away from the primary objective of returning to the
market.
Solution 3: Gradualism
The familiar saying, "time heals all wounds" is often true in the case of "pains"
resulting from transfers during the transition from regulation to competition.
Providing an adjustment period by deliberately lengthening the transition period is
probably the approach adopted most frequently to deal with significant changes in
government policy including regulatory policy. The Motor Carrier Act of 198025
and the Airline Deregulation Act, among others, provide for a phased approach in
introducing some of the major changes in regulatory policy.
The trucking legislation, for example, allows the industry a four year "grace"
period before their antitrust immunity for collectively fixing rates is substantially
reduced. The ICC has proposed a similarly gradual approach to the elimination of
antitrust immunity in the rail industry.2 6 In both cases, the industry's historic
dependence on collective pricing meant that a shift to individual competitive
pricing would require a substantial change in their business behavior. Similarly, the
two and one-half year period for bringing domestic crude oil prices to the world
level also reflects the need for all consumers in this case to adjust to significantly
higher prices. Allowing the affected parties time to react in this manner makes
these changes easier to accept and so enhances the possibility of realizing a return
to the marketplace.
24. Exempt Rail Transportation of Fresh FrOts and Vegetables: Initial Inpart, Nlanalv;ics,'Inc.. ICC-80-M -1159
(April 1980).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980).
26. Interstate Commerce Comm'n Special Conference on Rail Rate Borealis. Discussion lPaper and
Transcript (April 8, 1980).
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Solution 4: Direct Subsidies
A final method for addressing the transfers inherent in the transition is the
provision of direct subsidies. The airline deregulation legislation, for example,
authorizes a program of limited subsidies to communities left without commercial
air service after deregulation. 2 7 In a broad sense, subsidies act in much the same
manner as the side payments discussed earlier. However, the fact that subsidy
payments are borne by the taxpayer (in contrast to side payments between the
affected parties) engages an entirely different set of political forces, the upshot
being that the subsidy mechanism is less likely to be employed. Moreover, visible
subsidy programs, which are subIject to periodic review in the budget process, are
less likely to become a permanent source of industry revenues than the implicit
subsidies hidden within regulatory programs.
D.

Unequal Competitive Opportunities

The design of some transition mechanisms can unintentionally work to the
advantage of particular firms or industry segments by allowing them greater
opportunities to exploit the new, competitive environment than would normally be
the case. There may be ways to remove or mute these distorting elements unless
they are required to meet some more compelling ob)Jective.
For example, one early version of the trucking deregulation legislation allowed
trucking companies to rid themselves of the myriad of operating restrictions placed

on them if they could prove-presumably through analytical studies of some
sort-that this would increase fuel efficiency. - The majority of the nation's 17,000
to 18,000 regulated trucking companies already find the legal costs associated with
ICC regulation burdensome. Thus, it is likely that this provision would permit
larger trucking firms with a greater capacity to perform or pay for these studies to
free themselves from these restrictions more (uiIckly than most. They would then
gain an early competitive advantage in the move toward the market not because of
aggressive management or greater efficiency, but because of the construction of the
transition mechanism.
A more difficult example arises in the case of deregulation of the intercity bus
industry. The two largest bus companies-Greyhound and Trailways-dominate
the intercity regular route segment of the industry. In large part, their dominance
may be the result of route awards and regulatory protection from competition. An
early ICC staff report recommended substantial changes to reduce regulation of
intercity passenger bus services.2t However, the staff report also recommended that
eased entry into new markets and routes apply only to carriers with less than 15
percent of the total intercity passenger market.3t
The staff's objective was clear: restrict those carriers which became dominant
tinder regulation to give smaller firms and new entrants a chance to establish
27.
28.
29.

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 33(a). 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (Supp. 11 1978).
H.R. 6418, The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 9fth Cong.. 2d Sess. (1980).
Report of the Bus Industry Study ( ;oup. Interstate Commerce (onm'n (October 1979).

30.

This number just happens to separate Greyhound and Trailways from the remainder of the

industry.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

REPORT OF T-iE

Bus

INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP (Oct.

1979).
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themselves as effective competitors. Otherwise, those carriers which were most
successful in manipulating the route award systel under regulation would be
advantageously positioned as the industry moved to more or less unrestricted
competition. Furthermore, a temporary withholding of the benefits of deregulation
from the largest firms often makes the move toward competition more palatable to
the remainder of the industry.
These are not frivolous arguments. But, if Greyhound and Trailway's dominance is due more to their efficiency than to regulatory policy, restrictions like the
"15 percent rule" will deny some passengers the benefits of unrestricted competition between all carriers during the transition period. Moreover, the entire exercise
and the costs entailed will prove fruitless if the large system economies ensure that
a few, large, efficient firms will ultimately dominate the intercity bus passenger
market. Finally, we suspect there will always be a temptation to make these
restrictions (and their costs) permanent and that this temptation is strongest when
:
these scale economies are most evident. '
A final example is the case of direct intermodal competition with only one
mode burdened by regulatory restrictions. An early version of the trucking
deregulation bill, for example, would have totally exempted the transportation of
processed food from regulation.3 2 However, transportation by rail of these same
commodities remain regulated. The history of transportation of fresh fruits and
vegetables referred to earlier suggests that a similar reform on the rail side would
prevent the railroads from losing out to trucks in this area simply because of a
change in regulatory policy as opposed to a shift in the inherent competitive
advantage of one mode versus the other.
Solution 1: Parallel Deregulation
Here again, a policy of parallel deregulation can sometimes solve the problem
of unequal competitive opportunities during transition. In the case of deregulation
of processed food moving by truck, it would make sense to allow the railroads
similar freedom. Similarly, in the case of trucking deregulation, a deliberate policy
of parallel deregulation in both the specialized truckload only (TL) and less-thantruckload (LTL) segments of the industry woild allow both types of carriers to
compete on an equal footing for traffic which could be routed through either
operation. Parallel deregulation may be one of the more attractive and effective
solutions to certain transition problems since it does not involve the design of
complicated regulation instruments and offers opportunities rather than restrictions to the parties affected.
Solution 2: Limited Burdens in Transition
Another approach is to design a transition mechanism whose individual elements
do not, unnecessarily or inadvertently, grant significant competitive advantages
31.

An incredible example of this problem is the case of the subsidy to small oil refiners provided

"refined"
under the pretext of perfecting competition. These pay ments of up to S1.96 per barrel of oil

were provided by F.E.A. regulations in 1976. This subsidy has led to the substantial investment in
inefficient small refineries and a deadweight loss to the econonmy of appiroxinuatey, S150 million per year
by 1979. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, Office of Oil Policv.
32. S. 2245, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Motor Carrier Reform Ato of 1980.
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to particular firms or industry segments. In the example noted earlier, involving
operating restrictions on trucking companies, a relatively simple solution is to
eliminate or substantially reduce, the evidentiary and procedural burdens carriers
must bear in order to remove their restrictions.
Solution 3: Handicapping
Yet another potential solution to the problem of unequal competition opportunities is the use of "handicaps" or special regulatory restrictions on advantageously
positioned firms or industry segments. One example is the 15 percent rule,
mentioned earlier, which would maintain regulatory restrictions on entry for large
intercity bus carriers. Another example, is the recently-ended ICC policy of
attaching operating restrictions on merged railroads to prevent them from realizing the competitive advantages resulting from the efficiency gains made possible by
the merger.
While arguments, sometimes fairly persuasive arguments, can be made for
relying on transition "handicapping" in bus deregulation, rail nationalization, and
so on, in general, we believe that this is a poor approach. It re-emphasizes
regulatory solutions at a time when policy changes are meant to move closer to
reliance on the market. If poorly designed and applied-all unfortunately and
often inevitably common occurrence in regulatory policy-tnaking and adIlinistratio -handicaps can be ineffective at best and quite costly at worst. Finally. even the
brightest regulators cannot always tell which firms or industry segments are well
positioned, whether this is due to regulatory policy or efficiencv. and whether any
identifiable advantages we acttLally detect are significant enough to be decisive over
the length of the transition period. :"
E.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty is one of the many problems industrv, Investors, and bLuvers face
under regulation. It can also be a problem in matnaging the transition from
regulation to competition. Uncertainty presents different problems to different
groups. For industry, it niav coniplicate miajor long-term investment decisions.
During the Carter Administration's deliberations on the crude oil decontrol issue,
one official proposed that decontrol be made contingent on Congressional approval
of a windfall profits tax. As it was, Congress took a full year to pass the tax even
with decontrol virtually assured. :" Adopting the approach of' conditioning decontrol on the passage of a tax would almost certainly have resulted in a stand-off
lasting much longer, and ultimately might have doomted tile attempt to decontrol
crude oil prices. In the interin, the question of when and how the oil price
controls might be lifted would have imposed additional uncertaintv on important
exploration and investment decisions.
33. In this regard, we echo the sentiments expressed by Kahn on the question whether or not the
CAB should have managed the transition in airline deregulation with an eye toward handicapping or
promoting one airline versus another based on their pre-transition market position. Kahn, Application of
Economics to an Imperfect World, Am. Econ. Rev. (Ju,ne 1979).
34. President Carter proposed the tax on April 5, 1979. It was finalk apptroved b\ Congress ol1
March 27, 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-223. 94 Stat. 229.
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In the case of crude oil price controls, the transition scheme was relatively
(remarkably in our view) free of elements introducing additional uncertainty. This
was not true of the current bill to deregulate the trucking industry. The bill states,
in unambiguous terms, that a substantial portion of the immunity from the
antitrust laws now enjoyed by the trucking industry will end in 1984. However, the
bill also contains a provision requiring a study on this same issue by 1982, thus
intimating that the issue is not entirely settled. Worse still is the view expressed in
parts of the legislative history that the ICC should preserve, in some limited form,
the industry's ability to seek general rate increases. This has been the industry's
preferred pricing method and has been exercised collectively under the shield of
antitrust immunity.- 5 Thus, though the legislation appears Untambigous on the
antitrust issue, in fact, the water has been muddied and both truckers and shippers
are left with some uncertainty about the pricing regime in which they, will operate.
Solution 1: Cite a Date Certain in the Statute
One solution to the problem of uncertainty in transition periods is to set forth
specific dates on which major regulatory reforms become effective. We deliberately
refer to statutory dates here because, in many cases, the legislature can reasonably
be expected to set specific dates marking major steps in the transition rather than
defer to investigations and decisions by the regulatory agency. Moreover. a stattitory timetable is more difficult to revise than those which are set administratively and
so provides greater certainty.
Solution 2: Linkage
Another approach which tends to reduce uncertainty in transitions is to link
major changes with other reforms or events. For example, the greatest increase in
pricing freedom for trucking firms linked to changes in the industrV's immunity
from antitrust laws. Similarly, an automatic cost recovery scheme for the railroad
industry proposed by the ICC is linked to major changes in their antitrust
immunity. The ICC has also proposed a plan for teriminating the fuel surcharge
program which requires trucking companies using independent owner/operators to
assess surcharges on freight bills and pass these revenues directly through to the
driver. The proposal, however, links changes in the surcharge prograin totrucking
reforms which benefit independent owner/operators. " In each of these exanlples.
linking changes (and thus their otherwise separate Supporters) together tends to
increase the likelihood that they will actually occur.
Solution 3: Limit Opportunities For Policy Reversal.s
Finally, uncertainty during the transition period can he reduced by avoiding
explicit opportunities for reversing the new policy direction in midstrean. This
may involve omitting provisions which require that the change in (irection be
35.
36.

S. Rep. No. 641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980).

Discussion Paper and Transcript, Interstate Commerce (C urmn ,Sccal(onfe renct-eo 1n Ex Parte
No. 311 Fuel Surcharge Program (.March 25, 1980).
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reconsidered before it has been fully implemented. The trucking legislation which
requires a study on the antitrust immunity issue before the effective date of the
changes illustrates a failure to follow this approach. There may be other circumstances where opportunities for reconsideration will occur in the normal course of
events. The solution here is to design a transition which accomplishes, in large
part, the shift to the market before the point for reconsideration is reached.. This
allows a test of the entire policy, not merely the transition to it. For example, some
of the proposals for the decontrol of crude oil prices would have employed
transition periods stretching from 1979 to 1985. One of the many reasons a
somewhat shorter transition period was chosen was that the statute authorizing the
price control program expired in October 1981, providing an inevitable decision
point.
The reduced uncertainty brought about by limiting the opportunities for policy
reversals explains in part why legislatively-determined transition schemes are preferable to those developed by the regulatory agency itself. Regulators, the industry,
and consumers correctly view legislation as a more permanent expression of public
policy and much less likely to be reversed. The administrative processes of
regulatory agencies, by their very nature, provide frequent opportunities to reverse
or substantially revise policies as they are implemented.
We should make clear here that we are not advocating that all transition
mechanisms avoid opportunities for rehearing. This approach is recommended in
cases where there is a consensus to return to the market and the uncertainty
generated by obvious opportunities for reconsideration is seen as undesirable.
These may be instances where the anticipated outcome of a move toward the
market (or the elements of a transition scheme) is less certain to be beneficial. In
these cases, opportunities for reconsideration may be in order despite the increased
uncertainty.
F. Lumpiness
Many of us find it easier to accept and adjust to major changes if we can break
them down and take them a step at a time. For example, independent truckers,
who own and operate their own equipment under lease to certificated trucking
firms, face the possibility that the ICC will remove the mandatory surcharge
pass-through and leave their division of revenues to be determined by private
negotiation. There is no reason this must be done all at once. The mandated
portion of the division could be gradually reduced to allow the independents an
opportunity to renegotiate. Moreover, a more gradual approach to changes vital to
the independent's livelihood is less likely to result in a debilitating strike. Most
importantly, the gradual approach, by avoiding sudden wrenching changes during
the transition, makes it more likely that the process will be completed.
The problem of "lumpiness" in transitions is encountered frequently where the
return to the market effects sudden transfers, such as in the fuel surcharge noted
above or sudden changes in prices. Examples of the latter are crude oil decontrol,
deregulation of natural gas, and in certain instances, the institution of flexible
pricing in the airline industry.
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Solution 1: Gradualism and Floating Targets
Several recently initiated deregulation programs have relied heavily on gradualism to avoid sudden shifts during the transition: the crude oil decontrol schedule
takes twenty-one monthly steps from January 1980 to October 1981 to bring the
price of domestic crude oil to the world level. Controlled natural gas prices rise
incrementally based on the consumer price index during a transition period which
stretches from 1978 to 1985. Airline deregulation and the proposed reform of
regulations governing household goods movers provide limited pricing freedom
for some services.
Gradualism alone, however, will not solve the problem of lumpiness in transition in cases where regulated price levels must chase a moving target. Contrasting
crude oil decontrol with the deregulation of natural gas makes this point clear. In
the case of natural gas, it is becoming clear that the price escalator designed to
accomplish the transition from artificially low gas prices to the market price will not
be able to close the gap. The market price of unregulated gas, so far, has outpaced
the upward trajectory of controlled gas prices. Thus, it is likely that in 1985 a
sizeable gap may remain between the regulated and market prices for gas. This
would necessitate either a sudden leap in prices to close this gap or another
extension of the price controls on natural gas to complete the transition. And there
is always the unfortunate possibility that the circumstances in 1985 will lend7
themselves to a reversal of the only partially completed move to market pricing:
In contrast, the transition scheme for crude oil decontrol employs a price
trajectory that guarantees the gap will be closed by the time the price c)ntrol
program expires. Rather than raising domestic crude oil prices by a fixed monthly
increment, each monthly increment is adjusted to ensure that the controlled price
will reach the current world price by October 198 1.
Solution 2: Flexible Zones
The use of flexible pricing zones for regulated industries during the transition
period is another means for avoiding wrenching change. It is useful to compare
the zone used in airline deregulation with that contained in the trucking legislation.
The Airline Deregulation Act provided a relatively narrow pricing zone for
carriers. In just two years, fares for many medium-to-high cost services had
reached the top of the zone. Given that competition in most air markets has
become quite vigorous, it is likely that, unless the zone is widened, fares will leap
:
upward when rate regulation ceases entirely in 1985.

37. Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, the so-called "new gas," as defined by Section 102, is the
highest priced category. Still, in 1980, the Section 102 gas price is expected to be only 57 percent of the
alternative fuel price. While this price will escalate in real terms 3.7 percent per year through April
1981 and 4.2 percent per year from 1981 to 1984, it is expected to rise to only 61 percent of the
alternate fuel price. The entire domestic natural price, gas price control program is expected to result
in a $36.1 billion "gap" between revenues under controlled prices versus revenues under decontrol in
1984. A Preliminary Analysis of the "Gas Cushion," ICF, Inc., FERC (November 1979).

38. The CAB recently did act to broaden the zone by a substantial margin. See. Cixil Aeronautics
Board, Policy Statement No. 94 (June 11, 1980).
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The trucking legislation, however, contains provisions which automatically expand the zone over a three year period. In addition, there is a specific provision
authorizing the ICC to increase the size of the pricing zone by as much as five
percentage points each year if competition is deemed adequate. Thus, if Congress
decides to remove regulation of trucking rates altogether at some future date,
there is less chance that rate controls during the transition period will have driven
a new wedge between regulated and market-determined rates.
G. Slow Industry Response
A key element of any transition from regulation to c(ompetition is an aggressive
response to the new operating freedoms by the industry itself. For example.
although the passage of the 4R Act in 1976 gave the railroad industry dramatically
increased pricing fr-eedom, the railiroads have made little use of these new opportunities despite their precarious financial position. As this example suggests. to a
large extent, the rate at which firms exploit new opportunities which unfold during
the transition is beyond the direct control of regulatory policyrmaking. Yet, there
are means for encouraging sluggish industries to respond more quickly.
Solution 1: Revard Competitive Behavior
The regulatory agency almost always has the ability to adopt policies sought by
the industries it regulates. During transition periods. these charges can be targeted
to those firms which voluntarily relinquish traditional regulatory protections and
adopt normal competitive modes of' business behavior. An example is the zone of
reasonableness of rate-making freedom for the trucking industrv. In both the new
legislation and earlier administrative proposals, pricing freedom is granted on/v
when the firms proposing price changes are not in collusion.
Solution 2: Protection for Aggressive Competitors
Another means of stimulating voluntary change toward competition is the use
of regulatory devices which give the initiators of competitive challenges a period of
time to benefit from their action before their rivals can respond. One example is
the ICC's ability to require motor carriers responding to tale reductions filed on
short notice by their competitors to file their new rate thirty daxs before the
effective date. This gives their competitors a thirtx-day period during which they
enjoy a price advantage in soliciting traffic.
In general, we are skeptical of the need and the wisdom of' designing transition
schemes specifically to increase the rate at which firms adopt competitive behavior
typical of the market. Sometimes, elements of a transition scheme which contribute
to this end are fully justified on other grounds. This is true in the case of the
motor carrier rate-making zone, where pricing freedom is contingent upon individual noncollusive action. Here, public policy should not require buyers to face a
group of sellers who have both pricing freedom and immunity to fix prices
collectively.
But more often, regulatory "gimmicks" which deliberately reward particular
firms during the transition are likely to cause more harm than good. First.
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regulators may be rewarding conduct that is aggressive, although foolish by market
standards. Where other people's fortunes are at stake, regulators would( do well to
let them test the market in their own way during the transition. And secondly, a
transition mechanism, which treats firms inequitably solely on the basis of the
enthusiasm they exhibit in exploiting these new opportunities, may arouse forces
which endanger the entire policy of moving toward the market.
Solution 3: Reduce Uncertainty
While special regulatory incentives to stiniulate the competitive spirit of newly
deregulated firms may be counter-productive, there is little doubt that minimizing
uncertainty can serve to encourage industries to make the transition to competitive
behavior. As long as the industrV believes that the transition may be stalled or
reversed, they may fail to take the initial and sometimes expensive steps, such as
new exploration and drilling plans, the adoption of individual rather than collective pricing plans, or the purchase of new aircraft, which are necessary to adapt to
the new market-oriented regime. 'J
H.

Going All the Wav

Throughout the discussion to this point, we have made scattered references to
problems which could prevent a policy of returning to competition from being
carried out. This problem deserves more direct attention even at the expense of
repeating some of the points made earlier.
The issue of whether or not proposed transition schemes lend themselves to
fully accomplishing the return to competition is important for two reasons. Fiirst,
deregulation in many cases is vigorously contested by the defenders of government
regulation. If only partial reforms are adopted. the regulation of economic activitV
through competition will not really be tested. Second. we have found that meany
influential parties involved in the various deregulation debates have strong incentives to support policies which remove only some aspects of regulation while
preserving or strengthening others.
The debate over deregulation of the trucking industry provides some classic
examples of this tendency for individual interests to propose policies which never
result in completing the transition to the market. Some shipping groups, for
example, strongly supported less restrictive policies governing entry and expansion
in the trucking industry. At the same time. however, they opposed policies which
would allow the industry substantial freedom to raise rates. The trucking industry,
on the other hand, was anxious to gain pricing freedoin but resisted freer entry.
neither position would have produced a transition mechanism which would actually
achieve an effective return to the market.

39. Interestingly enough. a recent study of the initial experience with air'line deregulation suggests
that the subsidy program to encourage service to small C0l
t
ntill
ies has been i lCtcliVC ill illtuCIlCilg
business decisions primarily because of' doubts thaI he sultsidl
irograi
i sill CmitIlie.
\ccr. ()sic,
(omez-Abanex,

EarI Experiences with 4irline Derwgatioi: Some heplo atiAmI, /m .\l
h

Reform, Interstate Commerce Conim'n. at IV-5 (April 1980).
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Solution 1: Linkage
The most powerful approach in designing transition inechanisins which result
in an effective return to the market is to link key elements together. There is no
clearer example of this than the railroad-coal slir\' pipe contirovers,. In this
instance, these two industries have been locked iu political combat for over a
decade with the two key objectives pirstied by each industry-eninent domain for

the pipelines and deregulation for the railhroads-considered se/miah'll. To (late,
the result has been a stand-off with little benefit to the railroads and none at all
for the pipelines. While it is not certain that explicitly linking rail deregulation with
eminent domain for the pipelines will break the logjam, there is certainly reason to
hope

for better

progress it each one can come awax

froin the debate with

something of' value.
Developing the right linkages in a transition mechaiisin is often ditficult. One
important step is to identify first those parties which haive the power to block a
move toward the market generally judged to be in tihe public interest. The
linkages, then, can be arranged to recognize their interests and intluence. For
example, in the case of trucking deregulation, the trucking indusmitV seemed unable
to block the drive for substantial reforms. Shippers. hoxever. might have been able
to do so in this case because their interests in the outcome were perceived as
substantial, as they (along with consume rs) were vieed ts the chief beneficiaries of
reform. On the other hand. the trucking industrx x\'as not seen

ts suflering any

long-term financial hardship uder regulation ailnd in atlx Case has failed to push
for deregulation on its own behalf. I Lus, the er
p oxisions of the bill-the
central reform objective of most shipper groups-more than meet thei demands.
At the same time, however, the legislation provides substantiaml pricing freedom for
carriers, especially in the later stages of the transition period, despite shipper
concern over the removal of regulatory controls oti rates.
The trucking legislation also illustrates that linkage can prove difficult \xhere
the interest groups are not sufficiently dixided in tlhein objectives. 1)espite the
positions taken by the Administration. the ICC. and influentiail legislators, the
legislation does not eliminate the trucking industm xs inimnunity fxroI tile antitust
laws. This is one privilege that the industry fought hard to retain. A miajor reason
for the inability to make more sweeping changes ii this atrea is that some luat'or
shipper groups, in particular the National Indtustrial I lfl I League. Sippl Orted the
industry in thei- efforts to retain this protection. \WitIi the industr ui d elements of
what were perceived to be the beneficiaries of this refotin joined oil this issue, no
linkage was possible.
Another powerful example of linkage during transitioi, tihe windfall profits tax.
was mentioned earlier. Here, it was clear that ont one poxcrfl giOip, cosiuiers
and their representatives, possessed the power to block the move toward the
market. The windfall profits tax forged a link betweenc(rude oil decontrol and a
substantial increase in tax revenues from tile oil industr\. This par ictlat linkage
was so clear that even a substantial portion of the oil industr , which faced a
significant increase in their tax burden, accepted the tax foi the mnost part and
limited their arguments to its size and design.
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Solution 2: Avoid Faulty Transitions
A second means for ensuring that transitions once begun are actually completed
is to avoid flaws which make the transition unnecessarily painful or difficult.
Sudden price increases brought on either by an imbalance between effective
competition and pricing freedom or a failure to begin the transition with compensatory prices is likely to cause distress. The rapid jump in air cargo rates did not
seem to greatly distress the shipping community largely because compensatory
rates brought about dramatic improvements in service. The trucking industry,
however, sought in every way possible to use the example of air cargo rates to
block deregulation of their own industry.
II
FAST

TRANSITIONS

VFRSLS

(RAIJ)L\iS\I

In a recent address, Alfred Kahn stated his conviction that in making the
transition from regulation to the market, it is best not to move continuously
through each step adjusting to dlisruptions and distortions in the transition, but to
move as rapidly as possible.'"' We agree with Kahn that an approach which relies
on cautious, isolated steps followed by policies which patch up the new, albeit often
less serious, distortions encountered in transition is undesirable. It leads to greater
uncertainty about the ultimate resolution of regulatory policies and focuses too
much attention on regulatory "fixes" for short-term distortions that quite often in
the end can only be eliminated by successfully completing the transition.
However, we do not agree with the general conclusion that rapid transitions are
generally preferable to more gradual approaches which allow the affected interest
groups time to adjust to changes, particularly changes that. would be distressing
were they to occur in a short period of time. Rapid transitions, in our view. may be
desirable in three instances.
First, speed is acceptable when a rapid movement to the market will not
violently distress parties, particularly those interests whose Support or acquiescence
is a necessary element in the change. The decontrol of crude oil Prices is a case
where sudden change could have had disastrous consequences for reform. On the
other hand, there was no reason why rules barring entry into the trucking industry
could not be removed immediately since effective entry occurs over time and the
change has been preceded by several years of gradual liberalization in entry policy.
Second, rapid transitions are preferable when a satisfactory side payment is
available. In the case of rail mergers, for instance, a cash settlement in lieu of
placing operating restrictions on the merged lines can allow the rationalization
process, however sweeping its competitive effects, to take place inmediatelv. On
the other hand, Congress has shown no visible interest in compensating regulated
trucking companies for the value of their operating certificates. Nevertheless, the
mere fact that this potential side payment was available argued for a fast transition.

40.

Kahn, supra note 27. at 5.
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Third, rapid movement to the market is desirable when the inefficiencies from
regulation become intolerable. One of the reasons the Administration rejected
proposals to decontrol crude oil very gradually over a six year period was the
critical need to restrain consumption and stimulate production during a period of
world-wide crude shortages and political unrest in some of the major oil producing
countries. Similarly, there is a growing sentiment in the Congress and certainly at
the ICC to reduce the time involved in abandoning and restructuring rail lines to
reduce excess capacity despite the effect of these changes on particular shippers.
There is little doubt that this change is clue largely to the disastrous influence
regulation has had on the financial health of the railroads.
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The issue whether to go fast or slow in the transition from regulation to
competition reveals much about the nature of deregulation and the role economists
have played in it. Speed may seem desirable when one focuses on economic
distortions during the transition. But if"
one focuses on the ultimate objective of
completing the transition period, there is much to be said for a policy of gradualism. At times, it can present problems, as in the case of airline deregulation. where
the zone appears to be too small to maintain significant pricing fireedom through
the transition to complete deregulation. On the other hand, we are impressed by
the fact that nearly every successful or pending deregulation proposal employs
some type of gradual approach to change. This is

lot

an accident, but instead

reveals that the policymaking process resolves issues in faivor of ultimate objectives
to a greater extent than is commonly realized.
Focusing on successful completion of the transition period does involve an
examination of the economic consequences of the transition scheme, But, the virtue
of focusing on the entire landscape rather than .just the path beneath our feet is
that it directs attention to those transition problems, the economic and political
effects of which present a threat to the policy change itself. Economists ha'e done
an excellent job in revealing the power of the marketplace as the most efficient
regulator of economic activity. By doing so. they have provided advocates of
regulatory reform with an alternative regime superior to regulation in most
instances. However, economists as a whole have neglected the prollems of managing the transition from regulation to the market.
It is heartening to note, however, that the political process has been remarkably
sensitive to transition problems. Some transition schemes are clearly superior,
sometimes vastly superior, in our view, to others. But though there are numerous

examples of failures to fully address economic distortions and avoid political
pitfalls in the transition, the 4R Act, the Airline Deregulation Act. the pending
trucking and rail deregulation legislation, and the Natural (;as Policy Act. exhibit
at least a deliberate attempt to treat difficult transition problems.

Finally, it is even more heartening to note that. to our knowledge. no major
transition from regulation to competition initiated recently has ever been halted or
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reversed because of significant problems, explicitly addressed or otherwise, during
the transition. Admittedly, this may be due as much to a political climate which is
growing increasingly favorable to regulatory reform as to careful transition planning. Nevertheless, if we believe that a particular policy proposal which calls for a
return to the market is sound public policy, it is worth the time and effort to
develop a well-designed transition plan.

